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I. INTRODUCTION
For more than forty years Russia dismissed as lies charges that it
was responsible for the systematic murder in 1940 of over 22,000 Polish
citizens at Katyn Forest, primarily around Smolensk, Russia overlooking the
Dnieper River.1 Instead, at the Nuremberg War Crimes Trials and after, it
pinned the blame on the Nazis.2 Only after the fall of Communism did
Russia admit its responsibility and release relevant documents. But Russia
has not released all of the pertinent documents, especially those identifying
the persons who ordered the cover-up, euphemistically referred to as “the
Katyn Lie.”3 The path to accountability was muddled once again in 2004
when Russia halted its investigation into the matter.4 And now, eight years
after Russia ceased its investigation, and 72 years after the massacre, the
question remains whether Russia will ever fully release all pertinent
information and responsibly deal with the Katyn Forest atrocities.


J.D., NYU 1969; L.L.M. Hebrew University, Jerusalem, 1962; J.S.D., Yale University,
1976. Chairman, AG-International Law, Washington DC, which specializes in complex
issues of international law and policy. The writer is indebted to his legal assistant Gina Cortese for assistance on this paper.
1
See ALLEN PAUL, KATYN: STALIN’S MASSACRE AND THE TRIUMPH OF TRUTH i–xxiii
(2010) (detailing the lengths to which the Soviet Union went to blame Germany).
2
Id. at 334–37.
3
Zbigniew Gluza, The Katyn Massacre, KATYN CRIME, available at http://katyncrime.
pl/The,Katyn,Massacre,517.html (last visited June 11, 2012).
4
Poland Opens 1940 Massacre Probe, BBC NEWS (Dec. 1, 2004), http://news.bbc.co.
uk/2/hi/europe/4060479.stm.
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My own professional experience may be pertinent in understanding
the depth of the emotions involved in the quest for accountability. In 1979, I
served as the first trial attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice’s Office
of Special Investigations (OSI) dealing with denaturalization and
deportation of Nazi collaborators. My involvement in OSI’s first trial
required that I coordinate the appearance of many witnesses from Israel and
abroad. I asked them, “Why did you come?” “Not,” they would answer,
“because I care about punishment. It doesn’t mean anything to me at this
point. Nor do I care about compensation. No, I care about having a true
account of what actually happened.” The same sentiment was expressed to
me by families of victims of the Pan Am 103 bombing and the attack on the
Twin Towers in my representation of both these groups. Above and beyond
anything else, I discovered that the families of the victims want a true
account of what happened.
Accountability may lead to punishment. That, however, is a matter
reserved for the criminal justice system. In the civil context, accountability
generally takes the form of compensation for the victims or their families.
Or, it may do no more than create a historical record. Yet, that is valuable in
itself. Ideally, accountability would include all three: a historical record,
appropriate punitive action, and compensation. It is against this framework
that this article examines what avenues, in justice and in contemporary
international law, are accorded the families of the victims of the Katyn
Massacre.
II. ACCOUNTABILITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
A.

Accountability in International Criminal Law

International law proscribes certain egregious acts as embodied in
treaties (conventional law) or as embodied in jus cogens (customary
preemptory norms). Although pertinent conventional international law does
not necessarily bind Russia insofar as it may not be a party to these
conventions,5 it nevertheless sets forth standards of behavior appropriate for
measuring responsibility for Katyn.
Questions of jurisdiction aside, it is indisputable that the Katyn
Forest Massacre is a crime under both conventional and customary
5
Michael P. Scharf, The ICC’s Jurisdiction over the Nationals of Non-Party States, in
THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NATIONAL SECURITY AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 213, 220 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000). However, see
later in the discussion, as Russia might be held liable under these Conventions in a suit
brought in the ECHR by relatives of victims of the Katyn Forest Massacre. See generally
Janowiec and Others v. Russia, Judgment, App. Nos. 55508/07, 29520/09 (Eur. Ct. H.R.,
2012), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action
=html&highlight=29520/09&sessionid=96396662&skin=hudoc-enpdf.
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international law. It was a war crime within the meaning of the 1907 Hague
Convention on Land Warfare,6 as well as customary international law later
codified by the 1949 Geneva Conventions.7 Article 23 of the 1907 Hague
Convention forbids the “kill[ing] or wound[ing] treacherously [of]
individuals belonging to the hostile nation or army,” as well as the “kill[ing]
or wound[ing] of an enemy who, having laid down his arms, or having no
longer means of defense, has surrendered at discretion.”8 Likewise, the
Geneva Convention requires the humane treatment of prisoners of war.9 The
Soviets, by individually murdering over 22,000 Poles with shots to the back
of the head, clearly committed war crimes within meaning of these
conventions.10 And under international criminal law principles of
responsibility, a state adjudged guilty of war crimes must pay compensation
to victims or their families—or restitution to the state involved—through
monetary, or at least, symbolic means.11
Under contemporary international law, as defined by U.S. courts,
Katyn also represented state-sponsored genocidal terrorism.12 The standard
set forth by the U.S. district court in Almog v. Arab Bank regarding Hamas
suicide bombers is applicable here, at least in principle.13 There, the court
held that because Hamas aims to “liberate the area [Israel] by replacing it
with an Islamic or Palestinian State through the use of suicide bombings . . .
[this] reflect[s] an intent to target people based on criteria prohibited by
both the Genocide Convention and the Rome Statute.”14 By that measure,
6
See Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36
Stat. 2277, TS No. 539 (entered into force Jan. 26, 1910) [hereinafter Hague Convention IV].
7
See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention] (noting that the regulations
were included in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 adopted in 1977).
8
Hague Convention IV, supra note 6, art. 23(a)–(c).
9
Geneva Convention, supra note 7, art. 3 (noting the prohibition of certain harms to
prisoners of war). The Convention goes on to require detaining powers to allow prisoners to
receive remittances of money from their home countries and to pay the prisoners at a fair rate
for work done. Id. arts. 61–63.
10
Id. art. 3(d) (noting that the “passing of sentences and the carrying out of executions
without previous judgment pronounced” by court affording judicial guarantees is prohibited
by the Geneva Convention).
11
Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Rep. of
the Int’l Comm’n, 53th Sess., 2001, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, available at http://untreaty.un.org/
ilc/texts/instruments/ English/commentaries/9_ 6_2001.pdf.
12
Inessa Jazhborovskaya, The Katyn Case: Working to Learn the Truth, 42 SOC. SCI. 34,
46 (2011), available at http://www.eastviewpress.com/Files/SS_FROM%20THE%20CURR
ENT%20ISSUE_No.%204_2011.pdf.
13
Almog v. Arab Bank, 471 F.Supp.2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) A case for which the author
served as lead counsel for the Plaintiffs.
14
Id. at 275–76.
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the Soviet killings at Katyn were genocidal acts as well as war crimes, to the
extent that the Soviet Union’s aim in the killings was to eliminate the entire
officer corps in order to rob Poland of its intellectual and military elite,15
necessary for the formation of a viable independent post-war Poland.
Although the Katyn massacre was both a war crime and an act of
genocidal terrorism, Russia might argue that it is not legally accountable
under those standards by virtue of not having ratified the Hague
Convention16 and because the acts in question were committed before the
codification of the Geneva Convention.17 Similarly, since the United States
has not designated Russia as a state sponsor of terrorism, Russia may argue
that it cannot be legally bound by U.S. statutes enabling damage suits by
victims of terrorism against state sponsors.18 Nevertheless, the public
policies applicable to state sponsors of terrorism apply to Russia. Libya was
designated a state sponsor after the 1988 terrorist bombing of Pan Am 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, which resulted in 270 deaths.19 The Soviet Union
ordered the wholesale murder of a whole class of Polish citizens. Clearly,
the terrorist nature of the Soviet’s action is no less repugnant to
contemporary international values than the Libyan Lockerbie bombing.
B.

Customary Norms for Measuring Accountability

The U.N. has recognized the need for a tangible expression of
contrition coupled with compensation as the basis for terminating the statesponsor of terrorism designation. The U.N. Security Council articulated a
threefold requirement in its binding declaration on the 1988 Lockerbie
bombing: (1) renunciation of terrorism; (2) acceptance of responsibility; and
(3) just compensation.20 Although this standard does not legally bind
Russia, it effectively sets a norm as to how states must manifest contrition
for such acts.

15

The officer corps was drawn from the top echelon of Polish society.
Hague Convention IV, supra note 6.
17
See generally, The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols, INT’L
COMM. RED CROSS, http://www.icrc.org/eng/war-and-law/treaties-customary-law/genevaconventions/index.jsp (last visited June 11, 2012) (offering a general description of the Geneva Conventions and the text of all Conventions and additional protocols).
18
See Almog, 471 F.Supp.2d at 265–66 (giving background information on the AntiTerrorism Act).
19
State Sponsors: Libya, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., http://www.cfr.org/libya/state-spons
ors-libya/p9363 (last updated Dec. 2005).
20
See S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/RES/731 (Jan. 21, 1992).
16
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Renunciation and acceptance

Russia has already renounced Katyn as a crime never to be
repeated.21 But it has failed to acknowledge, fully and unambiguously, that
it was a deliberate act of the Stalin regime undertaken for ideological
reasons rather than the acts of some errant military figures. By
contemporary standards, acceptance of responsibility does not require
admission of criminal culpability. It does require amenability to having an
international court determine criminal culpability. Thus, insofar as there
remain Soviet citizens who were personally involved in the Katyn
executions, Russia should subject them to ICC prosecution unless all the
relevant parties reach a mutually agreed upon alternative.
2.

Compensation

Russia has made no offer of compensation—neither monetary nor
symbolic.22 And the government of Poland has made no demand on Russia
for compensation, seemingly fearing political repercussions, and instead
remains focused on espousing reconciliation through exposure to the truth.23
Thus, under the standard set forth in the U.N. Declaration after the
Pan Am 103 flight bombing, Russia has not met international norms relative
to compensation for properly dealing with accountability to Poland for the
Katyn Forest Massacre.
C.

Relatives of Victims of Katyn Seek Venues for Accountability

Frustrated by Russia’s reluctance to make full disclosure, and
driven by a sense of injustice, individual relatives of victims of Katyn have
recently looked to the international community to pursue accountability for
the massacre.
Fifteen relatives of victims of Katyn sought relief for the murders of
their family members at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR),
24
and their case was docketed based on two complaints filed against

21

KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 256 (Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Lebedeva
& Wojciech Materski eds., Marian Schwartz, Anna M. Cienciala & Maia A. Kipp trans.,
2007) (describing the investigation conducted in July 1991 regarding previously undisclosed
information about the massacre).
22
Id. at 261.
23
See Warsaw Drops Katyn Compensation Claim – Ambassador, TATAR-INFORM (Feb. 28,
2011) http://eng.tatar-inform.ru/news/2011/02/28/34784/ (discussing Poland’s refusal to seek
compensation because of Russia’s cooperation in the investigation).
24
Court Set for Judgement on World War Two Katyn Massacre, HUM. RTS. EUR. (April
12, 2012) http://www.humanrightseurope.org/2012/04/court-set-for-judgement-on-world-war
-two-katyn-massacre/.
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Russia.25 The complaints alleged that: (1) under Article 2 of the European
Convention on Human Rights, the Russian authorities’ 1990 investigations
concerning the victims’ deaths were inadequate, and (2) the Russian
authorities’ reactions to the requests for investigation amounted to illtreatment under Article 3 of the Convention.26 On July 5, 2011, the ECHR
declared the complaints admissible.27
The ECHR decided the case on April 16, 2012.28 The Court had to
determine, in part, whether it could review the adequacy of Russia’s
investigation into events which occurred before Russia ratified the
Convention. Russia contended that the Court could not.29
The Court found that there had been a violation of Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights as to ten of the fifteen applicants,
as well as a violation of Russia’s obligation to cooperate with the Court
under Article 38 of the Convention.30 The Court held that it did not have
jurisdiction to hear a claim brought under Article 2 of the Convention, as
the acts in issue took place before the Convention was applicable.31
On balance, the ruling clearly favored the plaintiffs’ claims insofar
as the Court found that the Russian authorities demonstrated “a flagrant,
continuous and callous disregard” for the concerns and anxieties of the
families of victims.32 And importantly, it provided a basis for the
international community to hold Russia fully responsible for provision of a
complete and detailed record of the facts of the atrocity and its subsequent
cover-up.
25

Eur. Ct. H.R., Decision as to the Admissibility of Applications nos. 55508/07 and
29520/09 by Jerzy-Roman Janowiec and Others Against Russia (July 5, 2011), http://cmiskp.
echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=14&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=&sessionid=9
2029683&skin=hudoc-en [hereinafter Janowiec Admissibility Decision].
26
Id. at ¶¶ 74–75.
27
See generally id.
28
Janowiec and Others, App. Nos. 55508/07, 29520/09, ¶ 117–27.
29
Id. at ¶¶ 134–42.
30
Id. at ¶ 98.
31
Id.; see also Press Release, Eur. Ct. H.R., Russia Should have Cooperated with the
Court and Treated Katyń Victims’ Relatives Humanely, ECHR 163 (April 16, 2012).
The Court emphasised the difference between Article 2 and Article 3: under the
former the authorities were obliged to take specific action capable of leading to the
identification and punishment of those responsible, while under the latter the authorities had to react to the plight of bereaved relatives in a humane and compassionate way. It then found that the Convention did not prevent it from examining a
State’s compliance with its obligation under Article 3 even in cases where the
death itself could not be examined because it had taken place before the Convention had entered into force.
Id.
32
Janowiec Admissibility Decision, supra note 25.
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III. ACCOUNTABILITY IN U.S. COURTS
American jurisprudence, seeks to avoid making U.S. courts a forum
for resolving disputes that involve acts committed abroad when they do not
involve American citizens. Nevertheless, it also views the promotion of
universal respect for human rights as integral to U.S. judicial objectives, and
the U.S. Supreme Court has sought to balance these twin policies by
reserving resort to adjudication in U.S. courts in such matters to instances of
egregious abuse.33 How, therefore, does U.S. jurisprudence respond to the
relatives of victims of Katyn, who seek accountability and damages?
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS),34 which has been a principal avenue
for accountability in U.S. courts for victims of human rights violations,
provides the only potential legal cause of action for relatives of victims of
Katyn to bring perpetrators to justice in U.S. courts. The statute provides
that “[t]he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”35 In Kadic v. Karadzic, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the 2nd Circuit held in 1995 that the ATS provided a basis for
claims of Bosnian families of victims and that, in accordance with the
holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the law of nations prohibiting mass
murder of protected persons must be interpreted “as it has evolved and
exists among the nations of the world today.”36 In 2004 in its Sosa decision,
the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this standard.37 Karadzic in the end was
subjected to a default judgment for billions of dollars under the ATS.38
The Kadic claim, however, was based on the wrongdoing of a
person, whereas, here, the actions of a foreign state, Russia—as the
successor to the Soviet Union—are at issue. The ATS only allows for suits
33

See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004). In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, the
Supreme Court held that the Alien Tort Statute gives U.S. courts jurisdiction to hear “a relatively modest set of actions alleging violations of the law of nations.” Id. at 720. The Court
further held that “any claim based on the present-day law of nations” brought under Alien
Tort Statute jurisdiction must “rest on a norm of international character accepted by the
civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century
paradigms [the Court has] recognized,” namely violation of safe conducts, violation of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Id. at 725.
34
Alien Tort Statute of 1789, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
35
Id.
36
Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 at 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980)).
37
See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (“The position we take today has been assumed by some
federal courts for 24 years, ever since the Second Circuit decided Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.”).
38
See Judgment, Kadic v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 1163 (S.D.N.Y., Aug. 16, 2000) (awarding victims $745 million in compensatory and punitive damages); Judgment, Doe v.
Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 878 (S.D.N.Y., Oct. 4, 2000) (awarding $407 million in compensatory
damages and $3.8 billion in punitive damages).
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to be brought against individuals and corporations.39 Moreover, even were
the claims against Russia to focus on individuals rather than the state, the
authority of U.S. courts to assume jurisdiction against individuals and
corporations charged with gross human rights violations depends in large
measure on the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in a pending case, Kiobel v.
Royal Dutch Petroleum.40
In Kiobel, the U.S. Supreme Court must decide whether
corporations may be held liable under the ATS for violations of customary
international law.41 The decision, of course, will not set a precedent as to
whether jurisdiction will expand to reach states’ violations rather than
individuals and corporations. Nevertheless, an expansive reading of the
ATS would enable U.S. courts to be less tolerant of human rights violations,
even when committed abroad; and a restrictive interpretation would inhibit
the broad application of human rights principles.
But, even with an expanded reading of the ATS, victims would still
have to overcome the formidable obstacle of the Act of State Doctrine and
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, both of which severely limit the
ability to bring an action in a U.S. court against a foreign sovereign state or
official.42 The Court in Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics Group
described the Act of State Doctrine as “a consequence of domestic
separation of powers, reflecting ‘the strong sense of the Judicial Branch that
its engagement in the task of passing on the validity of foreign acts of state
may hinder the conduct of foreign affairs.’”43 The Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act is based on the same rationale.
Exceptions exist to both, such as where money damages are sought
against a foreign state or official for a personal injury or death,44 or in a suit
where “money damages are sought against a foreign state for personal
injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing,
aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or
39
See Jonathan C. Drimmer & Sarah R. Lamoree, Think Globally, Sue Locally: Trends
and Out-of-Court Tactics in Transnational Tort Actions, 29 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 456, 460
(2011) (discussing the evolution of Alien Tort Statute cases from those brought against governments and oppressive regimes to corporations).
40
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 80
U.S.L.W. 3237 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491).
41
See id.
42
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 USC § 1604 (1976). For a discussion on the act
of state doctrine, see generally Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S. 398, 400
(1964).
43
Kirkpatrick v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404 (1990) (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U. S. at 423).
44
General Exceptions to the Jurisdictional Immunity of a Foreign State, 28 U.S.C. § 1605
(a)(5).
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resources for such an act. . . .”45 But no exceptions exist that would allow a
suit to be brought in U.S. courts where a foreign state engages in violations
of the laws of the nations within the borders of its own territory.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although Russia may not be subject to a judgment of monetary or
punitive damages for its role in the Katyn Forest Massacre, Russia should
act in accordance with international norms to meet its responsibility to
accept accountability. These norms also suggest that Russia’s verbal
contrition should be accompanied by compensation.
Should Russia refuse, the families of the victims of Katyn might
seek accountability by asking the international community to take
cognizance of Russia’s actions through a U.N. resolution condemning
Russia’s violations of international norms with regard to full disclosure and
compensation. Although Russia would likely use its power as a member of
the U.N. Security Council to veto such a resolution, if presented in that
forum, the process would nonetheless create a historical record of Russia’s
violations. And that could be of twofold benefit: (1) publically document
the atrocity and its cover-up; and (2) disparage Russia’s actions in such a
way as to discourage similar state behavior by actors who do not have the
protection of veto power.
Faced with more intense scrutiny, Russia may respond to the calls
of the international community for compensation, even if only of a symbolic
nature. And, if Russia appropriately responds to such requests for
accountability, the ground for Russia and Poland to finally reach true
reconciliation would be established so that this dark saga of the past could
finally be put to rest.

45

Terrorism Exception to the Jurisdictional Immunity of a Foreign State, 28 U.S.C. §
1605A(a)(1).

